REA vs. SMITH ET AL.
RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS.

Superior Court of Cincinnati.
1
JOHN REA) PLAINTIFF IN ERROR v8. NATHANIEL SMITH ET AL.

1. A public officer, whose duty it is to arrest all persons charged with or suspected
of the commission of crime, cannot claim any other or further remuneration for
his services, than the fees allowed by law.
2. Whenevar an officer makes an arrest, he is supposed to be acting in his official
capacity; and where he performs the duty of sheriff, believing he was acting
within the authority derived from law, the court will not allow him to change the
relation and assume that of a private individual.
3. A sheriff, or any other.ministerial officer, may arrest fugitives from the justice of
any other State of the Union, and detain them for a reasonable time, until the
requisition of the Executive can be made.
4. A reward offered may be apportioned, upon equitable principles, among several
parties, as the court may direct.

James McMannus filed his petition at special term, against Nathaniel Smith, James Gardiner, and Darius C. Ingalls, claiming the
benefit of a reward offered for the apprehension and conviction of
the murderers of Alexander Gardiner and James Miller, who were
found dead and mangled in the Ohio river, near Troy, Indiana.
The offer of the reward was published in the Cincinnati Gazette and
Louisville Journal, and is as follows: "$500 Reward. We will
pay the above reward for the arrest and conviction of the murderer
or murderers of Messrs. Miller and Gardiner, The murders were
committed on their trading boat, near Troy, Indiana. Two of the
crew are missing, and they are suspected of being the perpetrators.
One of them has sandy hair, is rather delicate, about eighteen years
of age, and five feet ten inches high. The other is low set, stout
built, with large black whiskers, and about twenty-five years of
age." Signed, "Smith & Graham; payable at the house of Smith
& Graham."
It is alleged that the following December, the plaintiff gave information to officers connected with the police of the city of St.
We are indebted to the learnel reporters, Messrs. Handy, for this case, which
-ill be fu ntud
in 2 Handy Rep. 193, now in process of publication.-Ed. Am. L. R.
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Louis, which led to the arrest of Moses Kelly, one of the supposed
criminals, who was in consequence taken to Hancock county, Kentucky, where he was tried, convicted, and executed for the murder.
The other defendant, Ingalls, who was made a party to the action,
it is averred, demanded a portion of the reward, for his pretended services for assisting in the arrest of the other fugitive, Robert Kelly,
in Ripley county, Indiana. While the controversy was pending,
J. E. 0. Cozzens, who apprehended Moses Kelly in St. Louis, and
the plaintiff in error Rea, who actuallI arrested Robert Kelly, were
also made defendants. The case was submitted to Judge Storer, at
special term, who heard the evidence adduced by the parties, and
held that neither McMannus, Cozzens, Ingalls, or Rea, were entitled to receive any portion of the reward offered by the defendants,
Smith and Gardiner. .The plaintiff Rea excepted to the ruling of the
court, and moved for a new trial, on the ground that the decision
was against the law and the evidence, &c. This motion was overruled; to which the plaintiff also excepted, and now files his petition to reverse the judgment of the court. As the other claimants
have not joined the plaintiff in this action, it is not necessary to refer to the evidence upon which they founded their claim. It was
proved on the trial, to sustain the claim of the present plaintiff,'
that he was the sheriff of Ripley county, Indiana, when he arrested
Robert Kelly, that a warrant was then in his hands, and that he
called upon several persons to aid him. After the criminal was
apprehended, he was held in the sheriff's custody for several days,
brought in the meanwhile before an examining court, and finally
taken by the same sheriff to Hancock county, Kentucky, where the
culprit was tried, convicted, and executed.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
STORR, J.-The plaintiff in erf as assigned several causes for
the reversal of the judgment rendered in special term; but it seems
to us, the only question in the record proper for us to decide is this:
Can a public officer, whose duty it is to arrest all persons charged
with or suspected of the commission of crime, claim any other or
further remuneration for his services, than the fees allowed bylaw?
It was in evidence on the trial, as it appears by the bill of'excep-
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tions, that the plaintiff in error was acting as sheriff, and had a
warrant in his possession when he arrested the criminal. After his
apprehension, the murderer was brought before an examining court,
being then in the sheriff's custody, and there detained, until he was
removed to the place of trial in Kentucky, on the requisition of the
governor of that State.
We must regard, then, the arrest to have been made by a public
officer, who supposed and believed he was in the proper discharge
of his duty.
The law of Indiana forbids a sheriff, or other ministerial officer,
to receive greater fees than those it allows for the ordinary discharge of their duties, and is similar in its terms to our own statute
on the same subject. Both are enacted to prevent oppression and extortion by those who are bound to execute legal process. They but
affirm the common law, which declared all contracts entered into
upon any such consideration of no validity, and permitted the person who had paid any such extra compensation to an officer, to recover it back.
The leading case on this point is that of Bridge vs. Cage, Cro.
Jac. 103. A sheriff brought his action to recover £60 upon an
agreement, that if he executed a writ of elegit, he should receive
that sum, in addition to his legal fees, and the court held he could
not recover. The same rule is held in Hobart, 13 d.; .Nortonvs.
Simmes, Sir William Jones' Rep. 65; Badow vs. Salter, S. C.
Latch. Rep. 54. In Stotesbury vs. Smith, Burrows, 924, the question was again discussed. A capias was in the hands of the sheriff,
who "agreed to receive Stotesbury as bail, on the assurance he
should be paid six guineas for so doing. The bail was taken, but
the sum promised was not paid to the sheriff, who now claimed to
recover it, but the court would not aid him. The judges gave their
opinions seriatim, and it may not be unprofitable to quote them
briefly. Lord Mansfield said : "It is oppression to take money for
doing what the officer ought to do, even though it be the mere using
his discretion." Justice Dennison held "that he had never seen
such a demand stated in a court of justice: the officer would have
been liable to attachment for this fact, if he had been complained
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-.f for it."

Justice Foster said: "It would be a great inlet to oppression, if such a consideration could be established as legal ;" and
Justice Wilmot, whose opinion concluded the case, said "be thought
this a most shameful and scandalous action." This case is again
reported by Sir William Blackstone in 1 Black. Rep. 204, who well
observes, the court rendered this judgment with much indignation
upon the facts. Whether the same honest rebuke has been since
applied, or whether a necessity has existed for its expression, it is
not our province to inquire.
It is well said in 1 Hawkins' P. C. 68, pl. 4, "that if it should be
once allowed such promises could sustain an action, the people would
be quickly given to understand how kindly they would be taken
care of, and happy would that man be, who could have his business
well done without them."
So far has the principle been since carried in England, that Lord
Ellenborough, following the case of Harrisvs. Watson, Peake Cas.
72, held in Styll vs. rricek, 2 Camp. 317, "that a seaman to
whom extra wages had been promised when'the ship was in distress,
could not recover them, as he was bound by the nature and terms of
his contract to do his duty at all times, to the extent of his ability."
A similar doctrine is affirmed in Lane vs. Surell, 1 Chitty Rep.
175; Dow vs. .arsons, ib. 295, and Woodgale vs. Knatchbull, 2
T. R. 148.
The Court of Errors of New York, in Hatch vs. Mann, 15 Wendell, 50, fully adopt the English decisions, holding that a constable
could not recover a larger compensation than the statute allowed,
for serving process, and that a contract to pay him any such sum
could not be sustained.
In Pool vs. The City of Boston, 5 Cushing, 219, the Supreme
Court of Massachusetts decided that a watchman, whose duty it was
to arrest criminals, could not claim a reward offered by the government, for the arrest and conviction of an incendiary.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in Smith vs. Whildin, 10
Barr, 39, held that a ministerial officer, who was bound to execute
criminal process, could not claim a reward offered for the apprehension of a criminal. Judge Coulter in deciding the case, remarks:
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"It would open a door to profligacy, chicanery, and corruption, if
the officers appointed to carry out the criminal law were permitted
to stipulate by private contract ; it would open a door to the escape
of offenders by culpable supineness and indifference on the part of
those officers, and compel the injured persons to take upon themselves the burden of public prosecution."- The Supreme Court of
Tennessee, in Stamper vs. Temynle et al., 6 Humphreys, 118, affirm
the same doctrine.
Our own Supreme Court, in Gilmore vs. Lewis, 12 Ohio, 281,
have authoritatively settled the question, and we would have been
content to have referred only to the well considered opinion of
Judge Wood, without any other examination of the law, did we not
feel it to be our duty-when the obligations of ministerial officers,
we fear, are not always clearly understood, and in many cases are
but slightly regarded-to re-affirm what we believe to be sound law
and equally sound morality, and thus vindicate the principles by
which official conduct should be regulated, and oppression, under
color of law, redressed.:
It is contended, however, that the plaintiff in error, though holding the office of sheriff when he made the arrest, acted as a private
person; that it was not his duty to apprehend a fugitive from the
justice of another State, and cannot therefore be subjected to the
rule we have indicated.
On referring to the Revised Statutes of Indiana, vol. 2nd, pp.
10-11, we find the sheriff is declared to be "1a conservator of the
peace, and is bound to execute all process directed to him by legal
authority, and pursue and commit to the jail of the county all
felons." The power thus conferred is certainly broad enough to
authorize the apprehension of murderers or felons, whether the offence was committed in Indiana or Kentucky; and it is difficult for
us to perceive how the duty could be denied by the officer in every
proper case, whether the accused person was a fugitive, or a domestic felon. An admission of the contrary doctrine would change the
character of the sheriff from that 6f a high public functionary, to
whom the largest powers have been confided for the preservation of
the public peace and the protection of private right, to the passive
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condition of an agent, acting only as he may be directed by the
magistrate or the court. We cannot so regard the question.
Whenever an officer has made an arrest, he is presumed to have
acted in his official character; and where, as in the present case,
he performs the duty of a sheriff, believing he was acting within the
authority he derived from the law, we cannot permit him to change
his relation as an officer, and assume that of a private individual. He
might well have arrested without a warrant upon probable cause of
suspicion, if the necessity of the case required it, and he would have
been protected if the accused should afterwards have been discharged. Samuel vs. Payne,Douglass, 359; 17obbs vs. Branscombe
and others, 3 Campbell, 420; Holly vs. .Mix, 1 Chitty's Crim.
Law, 15, 3 Wendell, 853; Gwynne on Sheriffs, 528.
The precise question argued by the plaintiff in error was very
fully examined by McCoun, V. C., in City Bank vs. Banks and
others, 2 Edw. Oh. Rep. 95. In that case the bank was robbed
of a very large sum of money, and a reward of $10,000 offered for
the detection of the 6riminals. The property lost was recovered,
and a bill was filed by the bank to settle the rights of many claimants of the reward, among whom was the celebrated high constable Hayes. To avoid the operation of the principle, Hayes, who
made the arrest without warrant, and found the money in the burglar's trunk, urged that he acted as a private person throughout
the matter; no official duty being imposed upon him by any pro.cess. But the court held he was bound to arrest the criminal upon
probable cause of suspicion, and having assumed to act, apprehended
the culprit, and found the property upon search, he would not be
permitted to deny his official character. He could not change the
legal relation he sustained. He was asked to arrest a criminal by
those who had good ground to suspect his guilt, on the supposition
that he had the power to do so; he consented to discharge the duty,
and having undertaken to perform it, he must abide by his official
character.
We think the reasoning of this case disposes of the last objection
made by the plaintiff, and fully authorizes us to decide what we
should otherwise have decided upon general principles, that the
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judge at special term committed no error in hblding that there could
have been no recovery for the present plaintiff.
It may be proper for us further to hold, that i sheriff, or any
other ministerial officer, may arrest fugitives from the justice of any
other State of the Union, and detain them for a reasonable time,
until the requisition of the executive can be issued. We see no objection to such a course, and it is in harmony with the decisions of the
tribunals of other States.
In R. M. Charlton's Reports, the Superior Court of Georgia
held, that 'one charged with felony in one Seate, and fleeing to
another, may be arrested or detained until. an opportunity is afforded to the proper authority to demand the prisoner."
In 4 Harrington, 572, the Supreme Court of Delaware decided,
"that a judge or justice of the peace could order the arrest of a
fugitive from justice before demand."
The same power is affirmed by Ch. Jus. Tilghman in Respub. vs.
Deacon, 10 S. & R. 10, and again asserted in Reapub. vs. Wilson
et al., 7 Law Intelligencer, 148.
In Ohio the same practice prevailed, even before thfe passage of
the statute which now gives express power to magistrates to issue
warrants, and ministerial officers to apprehend the fugitives.
It is not to be doubted that, in every proper case, a recovery may
be had f6r a reward thus offered, by any person who gives .the information by which the arrest is made, and the criminal punished.
The proposal or offer to pay for the services, when accepted, creates
a liability which the courts will enforce. The English cases on the
subject are collected in a note .to Chitty on Contracts, p. 559, ed.
of 1855. See also Wentworth vs. Day, 3 Metcalf, 352; Loring
vs. Borton, 7 do 441; Gilmore vs. Lewie, 12 Ohio, 281.
We supposed !he reward-offered may be apportioned upon equitable principles, in a proper case, among several parties, as the'
court may direct., It is so held in iS ymmes vs. Frazier, 6 Mass.
344, and in 2 Edw. Ch. 95, already quoted.
Whether the sheriff in this case, if there had been no legal objection to his claim, could have brought himself within the terms of the
offer, we need not decide. It appears by his answer, that for seve-
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ral days before the arrest, the criminal had been generally suspected, and was believed to be guilty, and that it was upon such
information the party was apprehended. Nor is it now proper for
us to say, whether the evidence established any knowledge, on the
part of the officer, of the existence of the proposed reward, when
the felon was taken into custody..
Without further reference to adjudged cases, we are satisfied to
place our decision on the broad ground, that no officer of the law,
who is sworn to perform his duties, and bound to perform them to
the full measure of his ability, shall be permitted to violate the law;
that the only safe ground for the officer to occupy is to receive no
other compensation for his services than the statute allows ; and on no
other can he faithfully and impartially discharge his official obligations.
If it should be admitted, that the degree of vigilance is to be measured by the amount of extra compensation proffered or paid, and
those upon whom is imposed the service of legal process are to be
urged to duty by the promise of other reward than the fees allowed
by law, the administration of justice will no longer be maintained
in its certainty or itf purity. He only may then rely upon the fulfilment of official duty, who has the ability to pay the largest equivalent, or the least scruple to propose it.
The judgment of the court in special term is affirmed.
SPooner J"Brower, for plaintiff.
James & Jackson, for defendant.
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In the

Circuit Court of the United Statee for the Distriotsof

Cali-

fornia.-In Equity.
JAMES TOBIN ET AL. vs. ROBERT WALKINSHAW ET. AL.
1. On a motion for an injunction new matter set up by way of avoidance in the answer responsive to the bill, is to be deemed evidence in favor of the defendant,
as his sworn stateijent.
2. The fixed rule in equity, is, that where the rAghts of a person not before the
court will be affected by the decree asked, the court will not make it; but the
general rule is to be applied to each case as it arises, by the aid of precedent
cases.

MCALLISTER, J.--LAmong the numerous questions which have
been submitted during the argument. of this motion, there is one
which arrests attention in limine, and, in the view I have taken of
the case, will preclude a -decision on any other. That question is
one of jurisdiction. In advance of any discussion on this point, I
desire to advert to a question which was argued incidentally by the
solicitors for the respective parties. I allude to the question"fHow far is matter of avoidance in answer to be treated as evidence by the court'?" An examination of the authorities has conducted me to the conclusion that thg rule is, that upon the hearing,
after the answer is put in issue, new matter, set up by.way of avoidance, must be proved by defendant; but that on a motion for or on
a motion to dissolve an injunction, such new matter, in the answer
responsive to the bill, is to be deemed evidence in favor of defendant as his affidavit or sworn statement. As this opinion is necesthe desarily very extended on what I deem the principal point in.
cision of this motion, my reasons for the conclusion to which I have
come in relation to the question of new matter in the answer, will
be reserved for some future case or occasion.
In regard to the want of parties in this case, which gives rise to
the question of jurisdiction, it has been urged by complainants, that
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it is too late for defeiidants to object a want of parties, and that
this was matter only for plea in abatement.
Now a plea for want of parties is not matter for abatement. It
is a plea in bar, and goes to the whole bill as well to the discovery
as to the relief prayed. 1 Daniell Ch. p. 337. Again, the rule is,
that if want of parties is apparent on the face of the bill, the defect
may be taken advantage of by demurrer. If such defect be vital,
it may be insisted on at the hearing, and if the court proceed to a
decree, such decree may be reversed. If the defect is not apparent
on the bill, it'may be propounded by way of plea, or it may be relied on in a general answer. (Story's Pl. § 236.)
In Eppes vs. Van Deusen, 4 Paige, 75, it is said, defendant is not bound to demur or plead. He may make the objection in his answer, and may have the same benefit of the objection
at the hearing as if it had been taken by plea or answer.
The thirty-ninth rule of equity expressly gives the right to defendant to avail himself in his answer of anything which would be good in
the form of a plea in bar, and the fifty-second rule provides, that
where defendant by his answer suggests the want of parties, plaintiff shall be set at liberty, within fourteen days after answer filed,
to set down the cause for argument upon that objection alone.
These rules evidently authorize a party to avail himself of a defect
for want of parties as effectually in his answer as by plea in bar.
Had defendants availed theniselves of the right to plead in bar,
much time and discussion would have been saved. But they have
the right to bring forward their objecion in the form of an answer.
Having done so, I am called on to decide if there are such parties
before the court which will authorize it to adjudicate upon this
cause, whether this court be deemed a court of general equity jurisprudence, or whether the peculiar structure of the limited jurisdiction of this court under the constitution and laws of the United
States, be considered.
In Cameron vs. Roberts, 3 Wheaton, 591, where the citizenship
of the defendants other than Cameron did not appear on the record, the Supreme Court of the United States certified-" If a joint
interest vested in Cameron and the other defendants, the court had
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no jurisdiction over the cause. If a distinct interest vestedin Cameron, so that substantial justice (so far as he was interested,) could
be done, without affecting the other defendants, the jurisdiction of
the court might be exercised as to him alone."
In A1allow vs. Hinde, 12 Wheaton, 194, the principle is affirmed,
that though the rules as to parties in equity are somewhat flexible,
yet, where the court can make no decree between the paities before
it, upon their own rights, which are independent of the rights of
those not before it, it will not act. The court say: "We do not put
it on the ground of jurisdiction, but upon a broader ground, which
must apply to all courts of equity, whatever be their jurisdiction."
In Rumsell vs. Clarke'sRxecWutors, 7 Cranch, 98, the court say,
that merely formal parties might be dispensed with; but where parties are essential to the merits of the question, and may be much'
affected by the decree, such parties are indispensable.
The principle enunciated by the Supreme Court in foregoing
cases, is a reiteration of one universally recognized in equity jurisprudence. (Story's Eq. P1. §'137.)
The rule in equity differs from the rule of law, both in the necessity of.joining all interested parties in the suit, and in the option of
joining them as plaintiffs or defendants. At law, a disputed issue is
alone contested, the immediate disputants are. alone bound by the
decision, "and they alone are parties to the action. In equity a decree is asked, and not a decision only; and it is therefore requisite
that -all persons should be before the court, whose interests may be
affected by the proposed decrge, or whose concurrence is necessary
to a complete arrangement. (Adams' Equity, 699, 703, 704.)
The act of Congress of February 28, 1889, 5 Laws U. S. 321,
and the forty-seventh equity rule.of this court, have been cited by
complainant's solicitors and relied on to sustain the jurisdiction in
this case. They have also adduced the case of Doremus and
others vs. Nizon and others, 4 McLean, 126, as to the interpretation of the act of Congress. That was a Case at law. Now, it is
true, that by their provisions, the Circuit Courts of the United
States are authorized, in certain cases, to proceed against one or
more defendants in the absence of others, where such others are not
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inhabitants in, or found in the district when and where the suit is
brought. But both the act of Congress and the forty-seventh rule
have been elaborately considered, and the construction of them
fixed by the Supreme Court of the United States in the recent case
of Shields vs. Barron, 17 Howard, 141. In that case it is settled
that neither the act of Congress nor the rule impinges on the general doctrine, and that if the citizenship of parties be such that
their joinder would defeat the jurisdiction of the court, such fact
will not supersede the necessity of making them parties; so far as
the said act and rule apply to suits in equity, it is to be understood
they are no more than the legislative affirmance of the rule previously established by the adjudications of the Supreme Court of
the United States. The act of Congress removed any difficulty as
to jurisdiction between parties who are competent under the general rule of equity jurisprudence, and the forty-seventh rule of practice is only a declaration for the government of practitioners and
courts, of the effect of the act of Congress and the previous decisions of the Supreme Court. "It remains," say the court, "that
a Circuit Court can make no decree between the parties to the suit
which so far involves or depends upon the rights of an absent person that complete and full justice cannot be done between parties
to the suit, without affecting those rights." (17 How. 141.)
The general rule as to the parties to a bill is not, then, altered
by the act of Congress and the equity rule cited by solicitors for
complainants, nor is that rule affected by the limited jurisdiction of
the courts of the United States. The fact that a person is without
the reach of the process of the court will not dispense with the necessity of making such person a party, provided he is an indispensa-.
ble one.
Parties to bills are divided into three classes, 17 How. 141.
1. Nominal. 2. Necessary. 3. Indispensable. If a nominalparty
is beyond the reach of the process of the court, being a party having
no interest to be affected by the proposed decree, that fact cannot
defeat the proposed jurisdiction of the court. An instance of this
class of parties is where one is joined as a party for sake of conformity in the bill, having no interest, legal or equitable, to be
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affected by the decree. The second class, known as necessary parties, are such as have an interest in the controversy, and ought to
be made parties to enable the court to do complete justice by adjusting all the rights involved; still, if their interests are separable
from those before the court, they are not indispensable parties.
Mr. Justice Curtis has referred, as an instance of a necessary party,
to the case of Osborn vs. The Bank of the United Statie, 9 Wheaton, 738. This case has been cited, by solicitors for complainants,
as the strongest case, and in their written brief upon the p.oint
under consideration, they say: , This [case] seems to us conclusive
as to the rule in a case of trespass." It is due to the able counsel
and to the importaice of the question, that proper consideration be
paid to this case. We shall give it that consideration hereafter.
The third class of cases enumerated by Mr. Justice Curtis are
the indispensable, who have such an'interest in the controversy that
a -decree cannot be made without affecting that interest, and the inquiry is, Do. the pleadings in this case disclose the .fact, that there
are absent persons whose interests make them indispensable parties ?
The rule we are considering, laid down geneirally is, that where the
rights of an absen! person will be much affected by the decree asked
for, the court cannot proceed to a decree. This general rule is to
be applied to the circumstances of each case as they shall arise.
By ascettaining how this rule has been applied in precedent cases,
we will understand how to apply it to the case at bar.
In Mallow vs. .inde, 12 Wheaton, 194, the complainant set up a
claim to a tract of land, under a survey, No. 537, in the name of
John Campbell, who, by his ,will, devised and bequeathed this,
among other muniments of title, to .Richard Taylor and others, exebutors. in trust for the children of his sister. Taylor alone qualified and took upon himself the execution of the trust. He never
assigned or conveyed to the cestuis qu trust, but permitted them
to take the management of them into their own hands. Subsequently, -vhen these last had arrived at full age, they entered'into
contracts with one Elias Langham, whereby he became entitled to
survey No. 53T, and he subsequently conveyed the land to complainants. Thus stood the case, when the defendant Hinde, with
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full knowledge of the' rights of 'complainant, procured from Taylor
a military warrant belonging to him (Taylor) in his own right, made
an 'entry thereof in his (Hinde's) right, and having caused a survey
to be made thereupon covering survey No. 537, obtained a patent
for the land. Having thus got the legal title, he instituted actions
of ejectment against the complainants, and obtained judgments of
eviction against them. A bill, setting forth the whole transaction,
charging notice of complainants' rights, and gross fraud against
defendant, was filed, which prayed for an injunction to enjoin defendant from proceeding on his judgment, and for general relief.
Here was as tortious an act, and as great a fraud as could be perpetrated under the forms of law, charged upon defendant. The
defendant denied all fraud, set up the bona fides of the transactio'n, neither admitted nor denied the contracts between the cestuis que trust and Langham, and insisted, if there were any such,
they were fraudulent. Neither Taylor nor the cestuis que trust
were made parties, being out of the jurisdiction of the court. An
objection for want of' parties arose, and it was insisted that both
Taylor and the Ce0uz8 que trust were indispensable parties.
The court so decided. They say: The complainants claima
through certain contracts made between Langham and the cestui
que trusts. How can a court of equity decide that such contracts
ought to be decreed specifically without having the parties before
them? Such a proceeding would be contrary to all rules which
govern a court of equity, and against the principles of natural justice. In respect to Taylor, it was urged that he had parted with
his "incidental right ;" but the court determined that he, as well as
the cestuis que trust, were indispensable parties. " If," say the
Supreme Court, "the United States Courts were courts of general
jurisdiction, it could not be doubted that the absent persons would
be indispensable parties." But it is urged that the rule which prevails in courts of equity generally, that all the parties in interest
shall be brought before the.court, &c., ought not to be adopted by
the courts of the United States, because, from the peculiar structure
of their limited jurisdiction over persons, the application of the rule
in its full extent would often oust the court of its acknowledged
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jurisdiction over the persons and subject before it. In answer to
such argument, the court proceeds to show that no modification of
the rule to an extent by which the rights of an absent person may
be materially affected, is admissible, and conclude by saying-" We
put this case on the ground that no court of equity can adjudicate
directly upon a person's rights without the party being actually or
constructively before the court," and the bill was found defective
for want of parties.
In Brooks vs. Burt, 1 iBeavan, 106, 17 Eng. Chan. Rep. 106,
a bill was brought by one tenant in common against defendant, who,
it was alleged, had wrongfully and in defiance of complainant's
title, entered into possession and received the rents and profits of
the property; it was further alleged, that complainants had commenced an action of. ejectment for the premises which defendant
defended; that before the trial of such ejectment, plaintiff discovered
that the property was subject to an outstanding term which was'
vested in one Mr. Worsley, which defendant threatened to set up
to defeat the action at law; and lastly, the bill alleged that James
Wavel, the co-tenant in common with plaintiff, was at the time residing out of the jurisdiction of the court. (It should be observed
here, that the objection was, that the co-tenant in common was not
made a party complainant.) There was a general demurrer for
want of equity, on the ground that Wavel the co-tenant, and Worsley, in whom the outstanding term was vested, were indispensable
parties to the bill. The court decided that the holder of the outstanding term was not, but that the co-tenant was. On the argument it was urged in relation to Wavel, that hie was part owner of
the property; that among other things prayed for, was a declaration of right, the delivery of the title deeds of the property, and for
an account of the rents and profits, matters in which the absent
party was interested, and that, therefore, the suit which sought to
deal with the inheritance was defective for want of parties. To
this cQmplainants replied, that the proposition embodied in the objection was, that if there be twenty tenants in common, and a
stranger get possession, one of the tenants in common cannot recover the possession of the rents- and profits from the stranger with-
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out making the other'nineteen persons with whom he has no dispute, parties to the suit ; that this was an ejectment bill, and must
be governed by the same rules as an ejectment at law; that Wavel
the co-tenant, was out of the jurisdiction of the court. Lastly, it
was urged that the complainants 'were entitled to some portion of
the relief prayed for, and at the time of the hearing, he might
waive part of the relief sought, and obtain the rest; that the demurrer, therefore, covered too much, and must be overruled.
Such were the arguments by complainant in that case, and they
are similar to those urged in the case by complainant's solicitors.
To all, the Master of the Rolls replied: "It appears to me, this
demurrer must be allowed. * * * Where the demurrer is for want
of parties, it is not sufficient for plaintiff to say, that there is some
part of the relief which cannot be abandoned at the hearing. * * *
The bill prays for accounts and the delivery of title deeds. * * *
I conceive Wavel is a necessary party. * * * The demurrer must
be allowed." 1 Beavan, 106.
In Turner vs. Hill,. 11 Simons, 2, a bill was filed to compel defendant to transfer her share in a mine to complainant, which, it
was alleged, she had obtained by fraudulent means, and to account
for and to pay to plaintiff the profits thereof, and that a receiver
might be appointed of the profits of the mines. It was objected
that the other adventurers in the mine were indispensable parties,
inasmuch as an account was called for, and the vice chancellor decided against the objection on the sole ground that the bill did not
call for an account of the mine, but for that of the specific share
sued for. He says: "That passage in the prayer of the bill, which
asks for a receiver of the profits of the whole mines, is clearly a
mistake, for the plaintiff is seeking, by his bill, to recover no more
than a hundredth share of the mines; and therefore, in common
fairness of construction, that passage ought to be referred to the
profits of that share." Considering such to be the fair construction
of the bill, he decided it was unnecessary to make the other shareholders parties.
A similar decision, for the same reasons, was made in the case of
Turner vs. Borlase, 1.1 Simons, 17 ; an appeal was carried to the
8
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Lord Chancellor, 11 Simons, 18, and the decision in it confirmed,
the distinction drawn between a. prayer for the profits of the mine
and those of the particular share sued for, being carefully sustained.
In giving his decision on the appeal, the Chancellor said : "It
was, however, observed, that the bill prayed a receiver of the profits of the mines; and if that must necessarily be intended to mean
the general profits of the mine, it would be asking for that which
could not be granted, in the absence of all the other adventurers ;
but I do not understand the expression to have that meaning. All
the case made and relief asked, relate to the particular shares, &c.,
and I must understand the profits as to which the receiver is asked,
to be the profits spoken of, which makes the whole consistent, and
for which 2 u?)ose the other adventurers would not be necessary
parties." (11 Simons.)
The decision of the court below was therefore affirmed, and the
demurrer overruled; but the Chancellor, in conclusion, declared
that his judgment on the demurrer was on the facts admitted by it;
but if the facts at the hearing so admitted were not sustained, the
opinion he had just delivered could have no bearing on the case.
The principles deducible from foregoing authorities are1. That the general rule in equity is, that all persons whose interests may be materially affected by a decree, must be before the
court to enable it to act.
2. That this rule may be relaxed so as to dispose with formal, and,
under special circumstances, with necessary parties.
3. That the rule which has been announced by the decisions of
the Supreme Court of the United States is but a reiteration of the
doctrine of a court of equity in the application of its chancery jurisdiction.
4. That the act of Congress of February 28, 1839, and the fortyseventh rule of equity, which allow one or more defendants to be
sued in the absence of others without the jurisdiction of the court,
apply only to competent parties, are simply an affirmance of previous decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States, and do
not vary the rule as to indispensable parties. (17 How. 141.)
5. That the peculiar structure of the limited jurisdiction of the
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courts of the United States does not abolish or modify the rule as
to indispensable parties ; and the fact that such are without the
jurisdiction, will not enable the court to proceed against the parties before it.
6. That it has been decided by the Supreme Court of the United
States, 12 Wheaton, 194, that where complainant seeks to set
aside a fraudulent purchase of land by defendant, and to enjoin his
proceeding on a judgment he had obtained in an ejectment at law
against complainant, the party through whom latter claimed his
equitable title, was an indispensable party.
7. That it has been decided in the English Chancery, 1 Beavan,
106, that one tenant in common cannot, without joining with him
his co-tenant, sustain a bill in equity against the trespasser in possession, and enjoin him from setting up an outstanding term, i~iasmuch as the bill prayed for the delivery of title deeds and account
of the rents, these being matters in which the absent person was
interested, and was therefore an indispensable party; that where a
question arises as to liarties, it is not for the complainant to say,
the court must proceed to a hearing when he, (complainant,) may
disclaim a part of the relief and obtain the balance; and, lastly,
that the fact that the absent party resided out of the jurisdiction of
the court made no difference in the application of the rule. These
last principles are deducible from the case of Brooks vs. Burt, 1
Beavan, 105. It is to be again noted, that this was a case brought
by one tenant in common to assert a right against a wrong-doer, and
the absent tenant in common was deemed an indispensable party.
How much stronger is the case at bar, where it is sought to injuriously affect the rights of part owners, who are absent ? If, in
the former case, the person is deemed an indispensable party, a
fortiori he must be so deemed in the latter.
8. That it has been decided that, where a bill is filed to compel
defendant to transfer to complainant a share in a mine fraudulently
obtained by him, and to account for the profits thereof, jurisdiction
will be sustained on the ground, that the bill seeks only a specific
share in the profits thereof; but it is expressly affirmed, that if the
bill had sought for a delivery of title papers, which touches the in-
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Upon the authority of the cases cited above, I cannot doubt that
heritance, or for an account of the mines, these being matters in
which the other adventurers in the ibine were interested, the court
could not proceed, such other adventurers being indispensable parties.
Let us apply those principles to the case at bar. The complainants in their bill allege title to certain premises situate in this
State; that defendants have wrongfully entered into possession
thereof, and are. committing a trespass thereon by cutting down
timber and excavating mines or minerals therefrom, and that they,
(the complainants,) have instituted an action. of ejectment against
the defendants for the purpose of evicting them therefrom. The
bill prays against defendants1. That an account be taken for the year preceding the filing of
the bill, of the amount of timber cut and destroyed on the premises,
and a similar account of the quicksilver so taken.
*2. That injunction may issue to restrain defendants from further
trespass.
3. That a receiver be appointed to take charge of the mine, and
the reducing establishment connected therewith, and all the products thereof, now within the jurisdiction of this court.
4. That on the final hearing, the conveyances made under which
defendants claim title, may be ordered to be delivered up and canceled' the injunction made perpetual and for general relief.
An answer.has been filed, and the facts necessary to be looked to
in connection with the question as to parties, are, that there are proprietors of the mine and land other than defendants.. That of them,
four in number, viz: Eustaquio Barron, Eustachio M. Barren,
Martin La Piedra, and Martin Ortiz, are without the jurisdiction of
this court; that John Parrott and James A. Bolton are also coowners of the premises, and they are within .the reach of the pro-.
cess of the court. It is further averred, that long before the institution of the action of ejectment at law, and before the. exhibiting
of the bill, a contract -was entered into by the owners of the mine
with certain persons, for the working of them, and it is contended
that both the proprietors and contractors should be made parties.
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the owners are indispensable parties in this case. In the opinion of
the court the authority of cases is hardly needed.
What is the character of this bill ? It does not seek the interposition of this court to recover the specific shares of the mine or
land, and the profits thereof, property of the defendants.
If it
did, it would come within the authorities, and the limits of natural justice. But the bill asks, that an account of .profits belonging to other people, and title deeds to property, in which those other
and absent persons are as much interested and to a larger extent
than the defendants themselves, shall be canceled. It further asks
that the profits of all the owners should be wrested from them and
paid into the hands of a receiver. Now, can this court call for an
account of the profits of the mine, or arrest such profits, or direct a
cancellation and delivery of the title deeds, in the absence of parties both within and without the reach of its process, who are interested in those profits and those title deeds ? Were the court to
do any one of these things, would not the rights of the absent be
materially affected ? It is urged that the court can entertain jurisdiction of this case, issue the injunction, and wait until the hearing,
when the complainant may waive a portion of the relief prayed for,
and the court can decree so much of that relief as they may be entitled to. This course would be contrary to authority, and in violation of the reason of the thing. We have seen, that thd Lord
Chancellor has said inBrooks vs. Burt, that when the question of
parties arises, it is not sufficient for the complainant to say "that
there is some part of the relief which can be abandoned at the hearing." Again; apart from authority, on what ground of justice or
reason can this court arrest, by injunction, the profits of the mine
from absent persons until the hearing, for the purpose of ultimately
getting an account from the defendants of their specific interests?
Would the arrest of these profits "affect" the interest of the absent
owners ? If so, should a court of equity proceed in. their absence?
"Audi alteram partem" is alike a dictate of natural justice and a
precept of municipal law. I have searched in vain for a precedent
that would justify this course. The able counsel for complainants
would have found such, if any existed. The case of Osborne vs.
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The Bank United States has been adduced as the authority which
seems to them conclusive in favor of such jurisdiction, and it has
been intimated -to me by one of the counsel, that it has been exhibited to several of his professional brethren, -who concur in the
opinion that it is conclusive on the point. That case, therefore,
merits attention.
The opinion in that case occupies seventy-six pages of the reporter. To show what were the points decided, by traveling
through it, would be time misspent. But there is a short method
of doing this, and one, perhaps, which will conduct to a more correct conclusion than any this court could pursue. By reference to
the prospectus, published by Mr. Justice Curtis, in 17 Howard, it
will be found, that his plan, in giving his new edition of the Supreme
Court reports, was t6 endeavor to give, in the head notes, the substance of each decision. They are designed, he says, to show the
points decided by the cburt, not the dicta, or reasonings of the court.
Now, upon feference to his head notes to Osborne vs. The Bank of
the United States, we find.that the only points which, in his opinion,
were decided in that case, which touch the question under consideration, are-1. A court of equity'may restrain, by injunction, a public officer of a State from acting under a void law of a State, to destroy a franchise. 2. As the State cannot be joined as a defendant,
its agent may be sued alone; and if he has specific moneys or notes
wrongfully taken, in his possession, they may be ordered to be returned.
So far as any decision in this case goes, it does not touch the
case at bar. But reference has been had to certain observations
made by Chief Justice Marshall, while delivering the opinion of the
court, and citations from the opinion have been inserted in the brief
of solicitors for complainanf, which are deemed directly applicable
to the case at bar. The first citition is from 9 Wheaton, p. 842,
and is as follows: "The single act of levying the tax in the first
instance, is the cause'of an action at law; but that only affords a
remedy in chancery, which prevents the repetition and protects the
privilege. The same conservative principle which induces the court
to interpose its authority for the protection of exclusive privileges,

TOBIN vs. WALKINSHAW.

to prevent the commission of waste, even in some cases of trespass, and many cases of destruction, will, we think, apply in this.
Indeed, trespass is destruction where there is no privity of estate.
If the State of Ohio could have been made a party defendant, it can
scarcely be doubted that this would be a strong case for an injunction. The objection is, that as the real party cannot be brought
before the court, a suit cannot be maintained against the agents of
that party, and cases have been cited to show that a court of chancery will not make a decree, unless all those who are interested are
made parties to the suit. This is certainly true where it is in the
power of the plaintiff to make them parties ; but if the person who
is the real principal, the person who is the true source of the mischief, by whose power and for whose advantage it is done, be
exempt from all judicial process, it would be subversive of the best
established principles to say, that the laws could not afford the same
remedy against the agent employed in doing the wrong which they
would afford against him, could his principal be joined in the suit."
" It is admitted that the privilege is not communicated to the agent,
for the appellants acknowledge that an action at law would lie
against the agent, in which full compensation ought to be made for
the injury. It being admitted, then, that the agent is not privileged by his connection with his principal, that he is responsible for
his own act to the full extent of the injury, why should not the preventive power of the court also be applied to him ? Why may it
not restrain him from the commission of a wrong which it would
punish him for committing ?"
The propositions asserted in the above observations are1. That though the single act of an illegal tax is the subject of an
action at law, its repetition makes a continuing trespass, which a
court of equity may enjoin.
2. That where the principal is exempt from all judicial process,
being a sovereign State, the privilege which belongs to such principal is not communicated to the agent who does the wrong.
3. That under such circumstances the court, acting on the principle, "Lex non cogit impossiblia," will, at instance of complainant,
issue an injunction to restrain the agent from committing the tortious act.
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These propositions cannot control this case :
1. Because there is no question of principal and agent in this
case.
2. The necessity of dispensing with a necessary party who was
exempt from judicial process, does not exist in this case. (On page
846, 0. J. Marshall says: " Had it been in the power of complainant to make it [the State] a party, perhaps no decree ought to have
been pronounced.")
3. Because the attempt in this case is to make defendants liable
as principals in a tort, and ask the court to arrest the profits of
absent parties for the purpose of making defendants responsible for
the consequences of their own tortious act.
There are two other citations from the opinion of the court. The
first is, a continuation of the first above quoted, and is in these
words : "We put out of view the character of the principal as a
sovereign State, because that is made a distinct point, and consider
the question" as respects the want of parties." Here this second
citation ceases, and another is taken from the succeeding page (845)
as follows: "In the regular course of things the agent must pay
over the money immediately to his principal, and would thus place
it beyond the injured party, since his principal is not amenable to
the law. The remedy for the injury would be against the agent
only, and what agent could make compensation for such injury ?
The remedy would have nothing real in it. It would be a remedy
in name only, not in substance. This alone would, in our opinion,
be a sufficient reason for a court of equity. The injury would, in
fact, be irreparable, and the cases are innumerable in which injunctions are awarded on this ground." Now, this latter citation establishes this proposition, viz : That the agent would pay over to the
principal, who was exempt from all judicial process, and being unable to respond to the damages, the injury would be irreparable,
and, therefore, it is ground for injunction. To this extent it goes;
but the whole is dependent for its application upon the fact, whether
defendant is responsible upon an implied contract solely for the
amount in his hands. This is evident, as the court puts the hypo-
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thesis, "Now, if the party before the court could be responsible
for the whole injury," &c.
To prove why the court considers the defendant liable, it is necessary to cite the remarks which intervene between the two quotations cited above : "Now, if the party," say the court, "could be
responsible for the whole injury, why may he not be restrained," &c.
The appellants found their distinction on the legal principle, that
all trespasses are several as well as joint, without inquiring into
the validity of this reason, if it be true. We ask if it be true?
Will it be said, that the action of trespass is the only remedy given
for this injury ? Can it be denied that an action on the case for
money had and received to the plaintiff's use, might be maintained?
We think it cannot; and if such an action might be maintained, no
plausible reason suggests itself to us for the opinion that an injunction may not be-awarded to restrain the agent with as much propriety as it might be awarded to restrain the principal, could the
principal be made a party." It was on the ground, ,then, that the
equitable action for money had and received could be maintained
against the agent-for money in his hands, and received by him in
legal consideration, to the use of plaintiff-that 0. J.Marshall uses
the observations quoted to sustain the proposition that injunction
might issue to restrain the payment over by the agent to his principal. Can this apply to the case at bar ? No one pretends that
such action could lie against defendants in this case. Independently of all other views, there is one which covers this whole case,
and precludes the idea that it can control the one at bar. It has
been shown, that the absent parties are indispensable in this case.
Such was not the fact in the case relied on. The State of Ohio
was but a necessary party, and there was a discretion in the court
to dispense With such party. True, the interest of the State, in
quantity, extended to the whole amount in controversy; but what
was the nature of that interest ? It was not a vested nor an equitable interest. It was never in the possession of the absent party,
nor had the State an equitable right to it, for the court never could
recognize the possession of a fund, or an equitable right to it, for
the court never could recognize the possession of a fund, or an equi-
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table right to possession in the principal, where that fund had been
raised infraudem legis by the agent. The object of the bill was to
arrest the fund in its transit from the agent to the principal.
Hence, the nature of the interest held by the State was, to use the
language of Mr. Clay, in his argument, "a collateral and contingent interest," which will not make a party who must be joined.
Hence, again, Mr. Justice Curtis, in 1855, in the case of Shields vs.
Barron, 17 How. 148, in his classification of parties, enumerates
several instances of the different kinds of parties, excluding the case
of Osborne vs. The Bank United States from the class of indispensable, and including it among that of necessary parties, which latter, as we have seen, may, under peculiar circumstances, be dispensed with.
It is by attention to the distinction between ne cessary and indispensable parties, that the numerous decisions of the courts, made in
the application of the gQneral rule, may be harmonized.
Cases have.been referred to, in which persons who are without
the reach of the process of the court, have been dispensed with; but
in all such it will be found, that the absent peisons were either a
formal or necessary party, but not deemed indispensable.
In"this case I am satisfied that the owners of the mines are parties whose interests must necessarily be affected by any decree
which can be made in conformity with the prayer of this bill.
Cases are also cited to show that the courts of the United "States
will consider the rule as to parties flexible where the absent persons, who should be made parties, are out of the reach of the pro-cess of the court; but in each of them it will be found, that the
utmost extent to which-a relaxation has been carried, has been to
dispense with a necessary party only. But there is one feature in
this case which distinguishes it from all others'. It is, that two of
the absent persons, whose interests would be affected by a decree,
are residents of this city, and within the reach of the process of this
court. The only reason for .their omissiqn as parties is the fact,
that their introduction would oust the jurisdiction of this court.
But if bringing them before the court, this case would be beyond

